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            CLOMON V. JACKSON, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993)


     Debtor brought action against attorney whose name and facsimile of
his signature appeared on computer-generated collection letters, alleging
that attorney violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Peter C.
Dorsey, J., entered summary judgment in favor of debtor, and attorney
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jose A. Cabranes, Chief District Judge,
sitting by designation, held that: (1) mass produced collection letters
bearing facsimile of attorney's signature violated FDCPA provision
prohibiting false and misleading communications, and (2) under FDCPA,
award of $1,000 in "additional damages" was warranted against attorney.
     Affirmed.

                                *  *  *

Philip D. Jackson appeals from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut (Peter C. Dorsey, Judge) granting
summary judgment against him in an action for damages under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C.  1692-1692o. The district
court held that Jackson violated the FDCPA when he authorized the sending
of debt collection letters bearing his name and a facsimile of his
signature without first reviewing the collection letters or the files of
the persons to whom the letters were sent. We affirm.


                              BACKGROUND

     The appellant, Philip D. Jackson, is an attorney employed on a part-
time basis as general counsel for a debt collection agency, NCB
Collection Services ("NCB"). The agency collects debts on behalf of
American Family Publishers ("AFP"), an organization engaged in the
business of selling magazine subscriptions. This case arises out of an
attempt by NCB to collect a debt of $9.42 allegedly owed to AFP by the
appellee, Christ Clomon.
     NCB issues debt collection letters on behalf of AFP to approximately
one million debtors each year through a computerized mass-mailing system.
Under this system, AFP provides NCB with computer tapes containing
information about delinquent accounts. NCB then transfers this
information from the tapes to its own computer system which inserts each
debtor's name, address, account number, and balance due into a form
letter requesting payment of the debt. The computer system then causes
each letter to be printed, folded, and inserted into a window envelope
for mailing. If a debtor does not respond to the initial collection
letter, the computer automatically produces and mails additional letters
according to a predetermined schedule. The collection agency maintains
a program for assessing the reliability of its computer data, but no
employee of the agency reviews the file of any individual debtor until
the debtor responds to the agency's demands for payment.
     Clomon received a series of six forms letters from NCB regarding her
$9.42 debt to AFP. The first of this letters was sent on a form bearing
the logo of NCB and the name of "Althea Thomas, Account Supervisor." The
remaining five letters were sent on letterhead containing the following
words in the top margin:

     P.D. Jackson, G.C.       Offices of General Counsel
     Attorney-at-Law          336 Atlantic Avenue
                              East Rockaway, N.Y.  11518

In addition, each of these letters bore the following signature line:

     P.D. JACKSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW
     GENERAL COUNSEL
     NCB COLLECTION SERVICES

The information in the letterhead and at the signature line was accurate,
at least in a literal sense. Jackson is indeed an attorney, admitted to
practice in the State of New York. He is employed as general counsel of
NCB Collection Services, albeit on a part-time basis, for which he
receives an annual salary of approximately $24,000. The address of NCB
Collection Services in New York State is 336 Atlantic Avenue, East
Rockaway, New York 11518. The letters were not, however, actually signed
by Jackson or any other person: each letter bore a mechanically
reproduced facsimile of the signature of "P.D. Jackson."
     The letters "signed" by Jackson were delivered to Clomon over a
period of more than two months, from March 1991 to early June of that
year. The letters contained a variety of threatening statements in an
apparent effort to induce Clomon to pay the amount she owed. The
following statements are representative of the letters' contents:

You have 30 days before we take any additional steps
deemed appropriate regarding your outstanding balance. .
. .

                        *  *  *

Based on information made available to us, we must
recommend that your creditor proceed with such further
action as the circumstances may indicate to dispose of
this outstanding balance.

                        *  *  *

After NCB reviews your collection file and previous
correspondence sent you, I am suggesting we take the
appropriate measures provided under the law to further
implement the collection of your seriously past due
account.

                        *  *  *

Your account was referred to us with instructions to
pursue this matter to the furthest extent we deem
appropriate.

                        *  *  *

Acting as General Counsel for NCB Collection Services, I
have told them that they can lawfully undertake
collection activity to collect your debt. . . .

                        *  *  *

Accordingly, the disposition of your account has been
scheduled for immediate review and/or further action as
deemed appropriate.

                        *  *  *

Because of your failure to make any effort to pay your
lawful debt ... we may find it necessary to recommend to
your creditor that appropriate action be taken to satisfy
the debt.

     Jackson asserts, and Clomon does not dispute, that he
personally approved the form letters used by NCB and that he also
approved the procedures according to which those letters were sent.
Jackson acknowledges, however, that he did ont have any direct
personal involvement in the mailing of letters to Clomon (or to any
other debtor): he never reviewed Clomon's file; he never reviewed
or signed any letter that was sent in his name to Clomon; he never
gave advice to AFP about what steps to take against Clomon. In
short, Jackson never considered the particular circumstances of
Clomon's case prior to the mailing of the letters and he never
participated personally in the mailing.
     In a complaint filed on September 23, 1991, Clomon alleged that
Jackson had violated the FDCPA in authorizing NCB to issue the
collection letters that she received. The district court denied
Jackson's motion for judgment on the pleadings on May 4, 1992. While
that motion was still pending, the parties submitted cross-motions
for summary judgment. The district court issued a written ruling
granting summary judgment for Clomon on May 11, 1992. The court
then granted, over objection, Clomon's motion for the maximum
statutory damages of $1000. The court found no actual damages. On
appeal, Jackson contends that the district court erred (1) in
finding that his conduct violated 15 U.S.C.  1692e, (2) in awarding
statutory damages in the amount of $1,000, and (3) in denying his
motion for judgment on the pleadings.

                           DISCUSSION

A. Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

     The FDCPA establishes a general prohibition against the use of
"false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in
connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C.  1692e. The
sixteen subsections of  1692e set forth a non-exhaustive list of
practices that fall within this ban. These subsections include:

(3) The false representation or implication
that any individual is an attorney or that any
communication is from an attorney.

                   *  *  *

(10) The use of any false representation or
deceptive means to collect or attempt to
collect any debt or to obtain information
concerning a consumer.

Id. Because the list in the sixteen subsections is non-exhaustive,
a debt collection practice can be a "false, deceptive, or
misleading" practice in violation of  1692e even if it does not
fall within any of the subsections of  1692e. A single violation
of  1692e is sufficient to establish civil liability under the
FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.  1692k (establishing civil liability for "any
debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this
subchapter").

     1. The "Least Sophisticated Consumer" Standard

     The most widely accepted test for determining whether a
collection letter violates  1692e is an objective standard based
on the "least sophisticated consumer." This standard has been widely
adopted by district courts in this circuit. See, e.g., JOHNSON V.
NCB COLLECTION SERVICES, 799 F.Supp. 1298, 1306 (D.Conn. 1992);
RABIDEAU V. MANAGEMENT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, 805 F.Supp. 1086, 1094
(W.D.N.Y. 1992); BRITTON V. WEISS, 1989 WL 148663, at *2, 1989
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 14610, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1989); CF. RIVIERIA
V. MAB COLLECTIONS, INC., 682 F.Supp. 174, 178 (W.D.N.Y. 1988)
(using "unsophisticated consumer" standard). This standard has also
been adopted by all federal appellate courts that have considered
the issue. SEE SMITH V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC., 953 F.2d 1025,
1028 (6th Cir. 1992); GRAZIANO V. HARRISON, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3rd
Cir. 1991); JETER V. CREDIT BUREAU, INC., 760 F.2d 1168, 1174-75
(11th Cir. 1985); BAKER V. G.C. SERVICES CORP., 677 F.2d 775, 778
(9th Cir. 1982). BUT SEE BLACKWELL V. PROFESSIONAL BUSINESS
SERVICES, OF GEORGIA, INC., 526 F.Supp. 535, 538 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(applying "reasonable consumer" standard). We now adopt the least-
sophisticated consumer standard for application in cases under 
1692e. In doing so, however, we examine in some detail the purposes
served by this standard as well as the extent of the liability that
it creates.
     The basic purpose of the least-sophisticated-consumer standard
is to ensure that the FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as
well as the shrewd. This standard is consistent with the norms that
courts have traditionally applied in consumer-protection law. More
than fifty years ago, the Supreme Court noted that

[t]he fact that a false statement may be obviously false
to those who are trained and experienced does not change
its character, nor take away its power to deceive others
less experienced. There is no duty resting upon a citizen
to suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts
the business. Laws are made to protect the trusting as
well as the suspicious.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. STANDARD EDUCATION SOCIETY, 302 U.S.
112, 116, 50 S.Ct. 113,115, 82 L.Ed. 141 (1937) (finding
encyclopedia-selling scheme in violation of Federal Trade Commission
Act). We subsequently sounded the same theme in our consumer-
protection cases, holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C.  41 ET SEQ., was not made "`for the
protection of experts, but for the public--that vast multitude which
includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.'" CHARLES
OF THE RITZ DISTRIBUTORS CORP. V. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 143 F.2d
676, 679 (2d Cir. 1910). This basic principle of consumer-protection
law took on its modern formulation several years later, when we held
that "[i]n evaluating the tendency of language to deceive, the
[Federal Trade] Commission should look not to the most sophisticated
readers but rather to the least." EXPOSITION PRESS, INC. V. FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961). In recent years,
as courts have incorporated the jurisprudence of the FTC Act into
their interpretations of the FDCPA, the language of EXPOSITION PRESS
has gradually evolved into what we now know as the least-
sophisticated-consumer standard. SEE, E.G., JETER, 760 F.2d at 1174-
75; BAKER, 677 F.2d at 778.
     To serve the purposes of the consumer-protection laws, courts
have attempted to articulate a standard for evaluating deceptiveness
that does not rely on assumptions about the "average" or "normal"
consumer. This effort is grounded, quite sensibly, in the assumption
that consumers of below-average sophistication or intelligence are
especially vulnerable to fraudulent schemes. The least-
sophisticated-consumer standard protects these consumers in a
variety of ways. First, courts have held that collection notices
violate the FDCPA if the notices contain language that "overshadows"
or "contradicts" other language that informs consumers of their
rights. SEE GRAZIANO, 950 F.2d at 111 (notice of right to respond
within thirty days is not effectively communicated with
contradictory demand for payment within ten days); SEE ALSO SWANSON
V. SOUTHERN OREGON CREDIT SERVICE, INC., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th
Cir. 1988) (same). In addition, courts have found collection notices
misleading where they employ format or typefaces which tend to
obscure important information that appears in the notice. SEE BAKER,
677 F.2d at 778 (required information must be "large enough to be
easily read and sufficiently prominent to be noticed"). Finally,
courts have held that collection notices can be deceptive if they
are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one
of which is inaccurate. See DUTTON V. WOLHAR, 809 F.Supp. 1130, 1141
(D.Del. 1992) ("least sophisticated debtor is not charged with
gleaning the more subtle of the two interpretations" of collection
notice); BRITTON, 1989 WL 148663 at *2, at *6 (deceptiveness of
collection notices "should be assessed in terms of the impression
likely to be left on the unsophisticated consumer").
     It should be emphasized that in crafting a norm that protects
the naive and the credulous the courts have carefully preserved the
concept of reasonableness. SEE ROSA V. GAYNOR, 784 F.Supp. 1,3
(D.Conn. 1989) (FDCPA "does not extend to every bizarre or
idiosyncratic interpretation" of a collection notice but "does reach

a reasonable interpretation of a notice by even the least
sophisticated"). Indeed, courts have consistently applied the least-
sophisticated-consumer standard in a manner that protects debt
collectors against liability for unreasonable misinterpretations of
collection notices. One court has held, for example, that collection
notices are not deceptive simply because certain essential
information is conveyed implicitly rather than explicitly. SEE
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, 953 F.2d at 1028-29 (collection notice that does
not expressly inform debtors of right to contest portion of debt is
not misleading, because that right is "implicit" in right to
challenge entire debt). Others courts have held that even the "least
sophisticated consumer" can be presumed to possess a rudimentary
amount of information about the world and a willingness to read a
collection notice with some care. SEE JOHNSON, 799 F.Supp. at 1306-
07 (finding that "even the least sophisticated debtor knows that a
`Revenue Department' may be a part of a department store or other
commercial creditor just as it may be a governmental body"); GAETANO
V. PAYCO OF WISCONSIN, INC., 774 F.Supp. 1404, 1411 (D. Conn. 1990)
(approving disclosures were printed only on the back of the notice,
since language on the front directed consumers to read the reverse).
     We do not, of course, have occasion here to adopt other courts'
interpretations of the least-sophisticated-consumer standard. But
the existence of this substantial body of law demonstrates that the
least-sophisticated-consumer standard effectively serves its dual
purpose: it (1) ensures the protection of all consumers, even the
naive and the trusting, against deceptive debt collection practices,
and (2) protects debt collectors against liability for bizarre or
idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices.

     2. Violation of Section 1692e

     In the proceedings below, the district court based its decision
to grant summary judgment on its determination that Jackson had
violated subsection (3) of  1692e. The court determined that
Jackson violated subsection (3) when he approved collection letters
which falsely implied that he had been retained for the purpose of
collecting a particular person's debt. Jackson now contends that the
court erred in holding that such conduct violated subsection (3).
Specifically, Jackson insists that the letters at issue here
complied with subsection (3) because they accurately state that he
is an attorney and that the letters are from him. He also argues
that the letters' overstatement of the degree of an attorney's
involvement in individual debtors' cases does not violate subsection
(3) or any other provision of  1692e. We find these arguments
unpersuasive.
     At the outset, it should be emphasized that the use of ANY
false, deceptive, or misleading representation in a collection
letter violates  1692e--regardless of whether the representation
in question violates a particular subsection of that provision. SEE
15 U.S.C.  1692e (specifying certain prohibited acts "[w]ithout
limiting the general application of the foregoing" language). Given
the broad sweep of this provision, it would be possible to uphold
the district court's decision to grant summary judgment for the
plaintiff even if the facts did not establish a violation of
subsection (3). We find, however, that the district court properly
concluded that the record establishes a violation of subsection (3).
We note that the record also establishes a violation of subsection
(10) and of the general ban in  1692e.
     First, the use of Jackson's letter head and signature on the
collection letters was sufficient to give the least sophisticated
consumer the impression that the letters were communications from
an attorney. This impression was false and misleading because in
fact Jackson did not review each debtor's file; he did not determine
when particular letters should be sent; he did not approve the
sending of particular letters based upon the recommendations of
others; and he did not see particular letters before they were sent-
-indeed, he did not even know the identities of the persons to whom
the letters were issued. In short, the fact that Jackson played
virtually no day-to-day role in the debt collection process supports
the conclusion that the collection letters were not "from" Jackson
in any meaningful sense of that word. Consequently, the facts of
this case establish a violation of subsection (3) of  1692e. SEE
MASUDA V. THOMAS RICHARDS & CO., 759 F.Supp. 1456, 1460-61 (C.D.Cal.
1991) (finding violation of subsection (3) where collection letter
falsely implied that attorney had personally reviewed debtor's
file); CF. ANTHES V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC., 765 F.Supp. 162, 166-
67 (D.Del. 1991) (finding no violation of subsection (3) where
collection letter directly from attorney's office and attorney
reviewed information provided by debt collection agency "to
independently determine whether one of his letters should be sent").
     We also note that the language used in the collection letters
was sufficient to cause the least sophisticated consumer to believe
that Jackson himself had considered individual debtor's files and
had made judgments about how to collect individual debts. The
letters stated that Jackson was "suggesting" certain measures be
taken "to further implement the collection of your seriously past
due account"; that Jackson had received "instructions" from his
client "to pursue this matter to the furthest extent we deem
appropriate"; that Jackson had "told" his client that it could
"lawfully undertake collection activity to collect your debt"; and
that Jackson had "scheduled" Clomon's debt for "immediate review
and/or further action as deemed appropriate." In short, the
collection letters would have led many consumers, and certainly the
least sophisticated consumer, to believe that an attorney had
personally considered the debtor's case before the letters were
sent. This language was false or misleading because, as noted above,
Jackson played virtually no day-to-day role in the debt collection
process--and certainly did not engage in any discussion with NCB or
AFP about how to collect Clomon's debt. Consequently, the facts of
this case establish a violation of subsection (10) of  1692e. SEE
PIPILES V. CREDIT BUREAU OF LOCKPORT, INC., 886 F.2d 22, 25-26 (2d
Cir. 1989) (finding violation of subsection (10) where collection
letter falsely implied that some action would be taken); SEE ALSO
GAETANO, 774 F.Supp. at 1415 (finding violation of subsection (10)
where defendant attempted to collect a debt when prohibited from
doing so by state law).
     In sum, the facts of this case provide ample grounds for the
district court's conclusion that Jackson violated  1692e. It is
clear that Jackson's conduct constituted a violation of subsection
(3), which prohibits the false representation that a collection
letter is a "communication ... from an attorney." The record also
establishes that Jackson's conduct constituted a violation of
subsection (10), which prohibits "[t]he use of any false
representation, or deceptive means to collect" a debt from a
consumer. Finally, we note that the misrepresentations contained in
these letters could also be characterized as violations of the
general ban in  1692e on the use of any "false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the collection
of any debt."1
     In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the appellant's
concern regarding the economic necessity of mass mailing in the debt
collection industry. It is apparent that mass mailing may sometimes
be the only feasible means of contacting a large number of
delinquent debtors, particularly when many of those debtors owe
relatively small sums. But it is also true that the FDCPA sets
boundaries within which debt collectors must operate. No mass
mailing technique is permissible--regardless of how effective it
might be--if that technique constitutes a false, deceptive, or
misleading communication. As we have found here, the use of an
attorney's signature on a collection letter implies that the letter
is "from" the attorney who signed it; it implies, in other words,
that the attorney directly controlled or supervised the process
through which the letter was sent. We have also found here that the
use of an attorney's signature implies--at least in the absence of
language to the contrary--that the attorney signing the letter
formed an opinion about how to manage the case of the debtor to whom
the letter was sent. In a mass mailing, these implications are
frequently false: the attorney whose signature is used might play
no role either in sending the letters or in determining who should
receive them. For this reason, there will be few, if any, cases in
which a mass-produced collection letter bearing the facsimile of
an attorney's signature will comply with the restrictions imposed
by  1692e.

B. Ruling on Motion for "Additional Damages"

The FDCPA provides that "any debt collector who fails to comply with
any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person" is
liable to such person. 15 U.S.C.  1692k. The statute further
provides that upon a finding of liability a court may award an
individual plaintiff actual damages in compensation for the harm
suffered as a result of the violation, "additional damages" not to
exceed $1,000, and reasonable costs and attorney's fees. See 15
U.S.C.  1692k(a)(1)-(3). In this case, Clomon requested no actual
damages and the district court awarded none. The court did, however,
grant Clomon's motion for $1,000 in "additional damages." The court
also awarded Clomon $2,975 for attorney's fees and $120 for costs.
On appeal, Jackson objects only to the award of "additional
damages."
     The decision on whether to award "additional damages" and on
the size of any such award is committed to the sound discretion of
the district court. SEE PIPILES, 886 F.2d at 27 (FDCPA gives
district courts "ample discretion" in assessing damages); SEE ALSO
EMANUEL V. AMERICAN CREDIT EXCHANGE, 870 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir.
1989) (decision to award "additional damages" is "discretionary").
The district court must, however, consider the frequency and
persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of
such noncompliance, the extent to which such noncompliance was
intentional, and other relevant factors in deciding the amount of
any "additional damages" awarded. SEE 15 U.S.C.  1692k(b).
     In arguing that the district court's award of "additional
damages" was an abuse of discretion, Jackson contends that his
noncompliance with  1692e was unintentional and in good faith.
Jackson asserts that he approved the collection letters at issue
here in reliance upon "authoritative interpretations" of the law by
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and by the district court in
HOWE V. READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., 686 F.Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y.
1988). This argument is not persuasive. First, the language of 
1692e is, by itself, sufficient to make it clear that these
collection letters violated the FDCPA. Section 1692e establishes a
broad ban on all false and misleading means of debt collection, and
it is clear that these letters misrepresented the nature of
Jackson's involvement in the debt collection process. Second, the
fact that the FTC received copies of these letters and expressed no
disapproval of them is not evidence that the FTC "authoritatively
interpreted" the letters as lawful or even that the FTC gave the
letters its "tacit approval."2 On the contrary, as the defendant
himself acknowledged in a deposition on this matter, the FTC
routinely receives copies of letters such as these without issuing
statements evaluating the letters' lawfulness. As an attorney
responsible for ensuring compliance with laws enforced by the FTC,
Jackson should have been familiar with this well-established
practice and therefore cannot contend that he believed the FTC's
silence indicated approval of these letters. Finally, the decision
in HOWE V. READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., SUPRA, does not state
or imply that the practices at issue here would be permitted by the
FDCPA. The HOWE decision does hold that a debt collector can rely
on the records of a creditor in determining whether to send
collection letters. SEE ID. at 467. But nothing in that decision
releases or purports to release an attorney from the obligation to
make SOME determination about a debtor's account prior to the
issuance of a collection letter bearing the attorney's signature.
More to the point, nothing in that decision releases or purports to
release any debt collector from the obligation under  1692e not to
use false or misleading communications as a debt-collecting device.
     In sum, we find sufficient grounds for the district court's
conclusion that Jackson knew or should have known that these
collections letters violated  1692e. For that reason, the court's
decision to award statutory damages of $1,000 was amply justified.

C. Ruling on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

     Jackson also challenges so much of the judgment as reflects the
district court's denial of his motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Although we agree that the pleadings here were scant, the district
court's refusal to dismiss the action was not an abuse of
discretion. In any event, the undisputed facts as presented on the
summary judgment motion served as a basis to redeem the complaint
amended to conform with the proof pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b).


                           CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is
affirmed.
-----
1.   On appeal, Jackson addressed two additional potential bases for
     the court's summary judgment ruling. Jackson argued (1) that
     he never violated 15 U.S.C.  1692j, which forbids the use of
     forms that create the false impression that anyone other than
     the creditor is involved in the collection effort, and (2) that
     he did not violate the FDCPA in sending collection notices to
     Connecticut without being admitted to practice in that state.
     Because the district court's decision to summary judgment was
     proper, we need not consider whether these additional grounds
     existed for that court's decision.
2.   The record indicates that copies of these notices were provided
     to the FTC by AFP, the magazine subscriptions company that
     employed Jackson to collect Clomon's debt. Although the
     evidence in the record is incomplete, it appears that AFP
     provided the notices as part of an agreement arising out of an
     investigation of AFP by the FTC for possible violations of the
     FDCPA. Jackson makes not attempt to describe the circumstances
     of this agreement, and he provides no evidence that the
     agreement entailed any review or evaluation of the notices by
     the FTC--much less any action or inaction of the FTC that could
     be said to confer an imprimatur on these collection letters.